How Capitalists Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Crisis by Bichler, Shimshon & Nitzan, Jonathan
real-world economics review, issue no. 66 
subscribe for free 
 
65 
 
How capitalists learned to stop worrying and love  
the crisis  
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan 1 
 [Israel and York University, Canada] 
Copyright: Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, 2014  
You may post comments on this paper at  
http://rwer.wordpress.com/comments-on-rwer-issue-no-66/  
 
 
Economic, financial and social commentators from all directions and of all persuasions are 
obsessed with the prospect of recovery. The world remains mired in a deep, prolonged crisis, 
and the key question seems to be how to get out of it.  
 
There is, however, a prior question that few if any bother to ask: Do capitalists want a 
recovery in the first place? Can they afford it? 
 
On the face of it, the question sounds silly: of course capitalists want a recovery; how else 
can they prosper? According to the textbooks, both mainstream and heterodox, capital 
accumulation and economic growth are two sides of the same process. Accumulation 
generates growth and growth fuels accumulation, so it seems bootless to ask whether 
capitalists want growth. Growth is their lifeline, and the more of it, the better it is. 
 
Or is it? 
 
Accumulation of what? 
 
The answer depends on what we mean by capital accumulation. The common view of this 
process is deeply utilitarian. Capitalists, we are told, seek to maximize their so-called ‘real 
wealth’: they try to accumulate as many machines, structures, inventories and intellectual 
property rights as they can. And the reason, supposedly, is straightforward. Capitalists are 
hedonic creatures. Like every other ‘economic agent’, their ultimate goal is to maximize their 
utility from consumption. This hedonic quest is best served by economic growth: more output 
enables more consumption; the faster the expansion of the economy, the more rapid the 
accumulation of ‘real’ capital; and the larger the capital stock, the greater the utility from its 
eventual consumption. Utility-seeking capitalists should therefore love booms and hate 
crises.2  
 
But that is not how real capitalists operate.  
 
The ultimate goal of modern capitalists – and perhaps of all capitalists since the very 
beginning of their system – is not utility, but power. They are driven not to maximize hedonic 
pleasure, but to ‘beat the average’. This aim is not a subjective preference. It is a rigid rule, 
dictated and enforced by the conflictual nature of the capitalist mode of power. Capitalism pits 
capitalists against other groups in society, as well as against each other. And in this 
                                                 
1 Shimshon Bichler teaches political economy at colleges and universities in Israel. Jonathan Nitzan teaches political 
economy at York University in Canada. All of their publications are available for free on The Bichler & Nitzan Archives 
(http://bnarchives.net). Research for this paper was partly supported by the SSHRC.  
2 For Marx, the end goal of accumulation is accumulation itself: ‘Accumulate, Accumulate! That is Moses and the Prophets! ... 
Accumulation for accumulation's sake, production for production’s sake’ (Marx 1867: 652). Contemporary Marxists, however, 
equate accumulation with the growth of the so-called ‘real’ capital stock, as published by the (neoclassical) national accounts. 
And since the latter accounts (supposedly) measure the util-generating capacity of said capital (OECD 2001), the ‘Marxist 
capitalist’, just like her mainstream counterpart, ends up pursuing hedonic pleasure… 
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multifaceted struggle for power, the yardstick is always relative. Capitalists are compelled and 
conditioned to accumulate differentially, to augment not their absolute utility but their earnings 
relative to others. They seek not to perform but to out-perform, and outperformance means 
re-distribution. Capitalists who beat the average redistribute income and assets in their 
favour; this redistribution raises their share of the total; and a larger share of the total means 
greater power stacked against others.  
 
Shifting the research focus from utility to power has far-reaching consequences. Most 
importantly, it means that capitalist performance should be gauged not in absolute terms of 
‘real’ consumption and production, but in financial-pecuniary terms of relative income and 
asset shares. And as we move from the materialist realm of hedonic pleasure to the 
differential process of conflict and power, the notion that capitalists love growth and yearn for 
recovery is no longer self evident.  
 
The accumulation of capital as power can be analyzed at many different levels. The most 
aggregate of these levels is the overall distribution of income between capitalists and other 
groups in society. In order to increase their power, approximated by their income share, 
capitalists have to strategically sabotage the rest of society. And one of their key weapons in 
this struggle is unemployment.  
 
The effect of unemployment on distribution is not obvious, at least not at first sight. Rising 
unemployment, insofar as it lowers the absolute (‘real’) level of activity, tends to hurt 
capitalists and employees alike. But the impact on money prices and wages can be highly 
differential, and this differential can move either way. If unemployment causes the ratio of 
price to unit wage cost to decline, capitalists will fall behind in the redistributional struggle, and 
this retreat is sure to make them impatient for recovery. But if the opposite turns out to be the 
case – that is, if unemployment helps raise the price/wage cost ratio – capitalists would have 
good reason to love crisis and indulge in stagnation. 
 
So which of these two scenarios pans out in practice? Do stagnation and crisis increase 
capitalist power? Does unemployment help capitalists raise their distributive share? Or is it 
the other way around? 
 
Unemployment and the capitalist income share 
 
Figures 1 and 2 examine this process in the United States, showing the relationship between 
the share of capital in domestic income and the rate of unemployment since the 1930s. The 
top panel of Figure 1 displays the levels of the two variables, both smoothed as 5-year 
moving averages. The solid line, plotted against the left log scale, depicts pre-tax profit and 
net interest as a percent of domestic income. The dotted line, plotted against the right log 
scale, exhibits the rate of unemployment as a share of the labour force. Note that the 
unemployment series is lagged three years, meaning that every observation shows the 
situation prevailing three years earlier. The bottom panel displays their respective annual 
rates of change of the two top variables, beginning in 1940. 
 
The same relationship is shown, somewhat differently, in Figure 2. This chart displays the 
same variables, but instead of plotting them against time, it plots them against each other. 
The capitalist share of domestic income is shown on the vertical axis, while the rate of 
unemployment three years earlier is shown on the horizontal axis (for a different examination 
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of this relationship, including its theoretical and historical nonlinearities, see Nitzan and 
Bichler 2009: 236-239, particularly Figures 12.1 and 12.2). 
 
Figure 1 U.S. Unemployment and the domestic income share of capital 1920-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data smoothed as 5-year moving averages. Profit is pre-tax and includes 
capital consumption adjustment (CCAdj) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA). Unemployment is 
expressed as a share of the labour force. The last data points are 2012 for profit and interest and 2013 
for unemployment. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global Insight (series codes: GDY for domestic 
income; ZBECOND for domestic pre-tax profit with CCAdj & IVA; INTNETDBUS for domestic net 
interest); Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition 
(online) (series code:Unemployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Percent for the 
unemployment rate [till 1947]); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics through Global Insight (series code: RUC 
for the unemployment rate, computed as annual averages of monthly data [1948 onward]). 
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Figure 2  U.S. Unemployment and the Domestic Income Share of Capital 1947-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data smoothed as 5-year moving averages. Profit is pre-tax and includes 
capital consumption adjustment (CCAdj) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA). Unemployment is 
expressed as a share of the labour force. The last data points are 2012 for profit and interest and 2013 
for unemployment. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global Insight (series codes: GDY for domestic 
income; ZBECOND for domestic pre-tax profit with CCAdj & IVA; INTNETDBUS for domestic net 
interest); Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition 
(online) (series code: Unemployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Percent for the 
unemployment rate [till 1947]); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics through Global Insight (series code: RUC 
for the unemployment rate, computed as annual averages of monthly data [1948 onward]). 
 
 
Now, readers conditioned by the prevailing dogma would expect the two variables to be 
inversely correlated. The economic consensus is that the capitalist income share in the 
advanced countries is procyclical (see for example, Giammarioli et al. 2002; Schneider 2011). 
Expressed in simple words, this belief means that capitalists should see their share of income 
rise in the boom when unemployment falls and decline in the bust when unemployment rises.  
 
But that is not what has happened in the United States. According to Figures 1 and 2, during 
the post-war era, the U.S. capitalist income share has moved countercyclically, rising in 
downturns and falling in booms.  
 
The relationship between the two series in the charts is clearly positive and very tight. 
Regressing the capitalist share of domestic income against the rate of unemployment three 
years earlier, we find that for every 1 per cent increase in unemployment, there is 0.8 per cent 
increase in the capitalist share of domestic income three years later (see the straight OLS 
regression line going through the observations in Figure 2). The R-squared of the regression 
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indicates that, between 1947 and 2012, changes in the unemployment rate accounted for 82 
per cent of the squared variations of capitalist income three years later.3  
 
The remarkable thing about this positive correlation is that it holds not only over the short-
term business cycle, but also in the long term. During the booming 1940s, when 
unemployment was very low, capitalists appropriated a relatively small share of domestic 
income. But as the boom fizzled, growth decelerated and stagnation started to creep in, the 
share of capital began to trend upward. The peak power of capital, measured by its overall 
income share, was recorded in the early 1990s, when unemployment was at post-war highs. 
The neoliberal globalization that followed brought lower unemployment and a smaller capital 
share, but not for long. In the late 2000s, the trend reversed again, with unemployment 
soaring and the distributive share of capital rising in tandem.  
 
 
Box 1: Underconsumption 
 
The empirical patterns shown in Figures 1 and 2 seem consistent with theories of 
underconsumption, particularly those associated with the Monopoly Capital School. According 
to these theories, the oligopolistic structure of modern capitalism is marked by a growing 
‘degree of monopoly’. The increasing degree of monopoly, they argue, mirrors the 
redistribution of income from labour to capital. Upward redistribution, they continue, breeds 
underconsumption. And underconsumption, they claim, leads to stagnation and crisis. The 
observed positive correlation between the U.S. capitalist share of income and the country’s 
unemployment rate, they would conclude, is only to be expected (cf. Kalecki 1933; 1939; 
1943; Steindl 1952; Tsuru 1956; Baran and Sweezy 1966; Magdoff and Sweezy 1983; Foster 
and Szlajfer 1984; for a survey of recent arguments and evidence, see van Treeck and Sturn 
2012; Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013) 
 
There is, however, a foundational difference between the under-consumptionist view and the 
claims made in this research note. In our opinion, the end goal of capitalists – and of capitalist 
organizations more generally – is the augmentation of differential power. This goal is pursued 
through strategic sabotage and is achieved when capitalists manage to systematically 
redistribute income and assets in their favour. The underconsumptionists, by contrast, share 
with mainstream economists the belief that capitalists are driven to maximize their ‘real’ 
capital stock. From this latter perspective, pro-capitalist redistribution is in fact detrimental to 
capitalist interests: the higher the capitalist income share, the stronger the tendency toward 
underconsumption and stagnation; and the more severe the stagnation, the greater the 
likelihood of capitalists suffering a ‘real’ accumulation crisis. 
 
 
 
Employment growth and the top 1% 
 
The power of capitalists can also be examined from the viewpoint of the infamous ‘Top 1%’. 
This group comprises the country’s highest income earners. It includes a variety of formal 
occupations, from managers and executives, to lawyers and doctors, to entertainers, sports 
stars and media operators, among others (Bakija, Cole, and Heim 2012), but most of its 
income is derived directly or indirectly from capital.  
                                                 
3 The three-year lag means that the redistributional consequences of unemployment are manifested only gradually. The 
exact nature of this gradual process requires further research.  
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The Top 1% features mostly in ‘social’ critiques of capitalism, echoing the conventional belief 
that accumulation is an ‘economic’ process of production and that the distribution of income is 
merely a derivative of that process.4 This belief, though, puts the world on its head. 
Distribution is not a corollary of accumulation, but its very essence. And as it turns out, in the 
United States, the distributional gains of the Top 1% have been boosted not by growth, but by 
stagnation. 
 
Figure 3 shows the century-long relationship between the income share of the Top 1% of the 
U.S. population and the annual growth rate of U.S. employment (with both series smoothed 
as 10-year moving averages).  
 
  
Figure 3 U.S. Income distribution and employment growth 1900-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data smoothed as 10-year moving averages. The trend dashed lines going 
through the employment growth series are drawn freehand. The income share of the Top 1% is inclusive 
of capital gains. The last data points are 2011 for the income share of the Top 1% and 2013 for 
employment growth.  
 
SOURCE: Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition 
(online) (series code: CivilianLaborForce_Employed_Total_Ba471_Thousand for employment [till 
1947]); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics through Global Insight (series code: ENS for employment, 
computed as annual averages of monthly data [1948 onward]); The World Top Incomes Database at 
http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/ for the income share of the Top 1%. 
                                                 
4 Following J.B. Clark (1899), neoclassical manuals assert that, under perfect competition, the income of every ‘factor of 
production’ is equal to its (marginal) productive contribution. In this way, capitalists, workers and the owners of raw materials 
receive in income what they add to the economy’s output and therefore to the well-being (i.e. utility) of society. The inequality 
arising from this process may create ‘social problems’ and ‘political instability’, but these unfortunate side effects are usually 
seen as lying safely outside the objective domain of economics proper.   
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The overall relationship is clearly negative. When stagnation sets in and employment growth 
decelerates, the income share of the Top 1% actually rises – and vice versa during a long-
term boom (reversing the causal link, we get the generalized underonsumptionist view, with 
rising overall inequality breeding stagnation – see Box 1). 
 
Historically, this negative relationship shows three distinct periods, indicated by the dashed, 
freely drawn line going through the employment growth series. The first period, from the turn 
of the century till the 1930s, is the so-called Gilded Age. Income inequality is rising and 
employment growth is plummeting.  
 
The second period, from the Great Depression till the early 1980s, is marked by the 
Keynesian welfare-warfare state. Higher taxation and spending make distribution more equal, 
while employment growth accelerates. Note the massive acceleration of employment growth 
during the Second World War and its subsequent deceleration bought by post-war 
demobilization. Obviously these dramatic movements were unrelated to income inequality, 
but they did not alter the series’ overall upward trend.  
 
The third period, from the early 1980s to the present, is marked by neoliberalism. In this 
period, monetarism assumes the commanding heights, inequality starts to soar and 
employment growth plummets. The current rate of employment growth hovers around zero 
while the Top 1% appropriates 20 per cent of all income – similar to the numbers recorded 
during Great Depression.  
 
How capitalists learned to stop worrying and love the crisis 
 
If we follow the conventional macroeconomic creed, whether mainstream or heterodox, U.S. 
capitalism is in bad shape. For nearly half a century, the country has watched economic 
growth and ‘real’ accumulation decelerate in tandem – so much so that that both measures 
now are pretty much at a standstill (Bichler and Nitzan 2013: 24, Figure 12). To make a bad 
situation worse, policy attempts to ‘get the economy going’ seem to have run out of fiscal and 
monetary ammunition (Bichler and Nitzan 2013: 2-13). Finally, and perhaps most ominously, 
many policymakers now openly admit to be ‘flying blind when steering their economies’ (Giles 
2013). 
 
And yet U.S. capitalists seem blasé about the crisis. Instead of being terrified by zero growth 
and a stationary capital stock, they are obsessed with ‘excessive’ deficits, ‘unsustainable 
debt’ and the ‘inflationary consequences’ of the Fed’s so-called quantitative easing. Few 
capitalists if any call on their government to lower unemployment and create more jobs, let 
alone to rethink the entire model of economic organization.   
 
The evidence in this research note serves to explain this nonchalant attitude: Simply put, U.S. 
capitalists are not worried about the crisis; they love it.  
 
Redistribution, by definition, is a zero-sum game: the relative gains of one group are the 
relative losses of others. However, in capitalism, the end goals of those struggling to 
redistribute income and assets can differ greatly. Workers, the self-employed and those who 
are out of work seek to increase their share in order to augment their well being. Capitalists, 
by contrast, fight for power. Contrary to other groups in society, capitalists are indifferent to 
‘real’ magnitudes. Driven by power, they gauge their success not in absolute units of utility, 
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but in differential pecuniary terms, relative to others. Moreover – and crucially – their 
differential performance-read-power depends on the extent to which they can strategically 
sabotage the very groups they seek to outperform.  
 
In this way, rising unemployment – which hammers the well-being of workers, unincorporated 
businesses and the unemployed – serves to boost the overall income share of capitalists. And 
as employment growth decelerates, the income share of the Top 1% – which includes the 
capitalists as well as their protective power belt – soars. Under these circumstances, what 
reason do capitalists have to ‘get the economy going’? Why worry about rising unemployment 
and zero job growth when these very processes serve to boost their income-share-read-
power? 
 
The process, of course, is not open-ended. There is a certain limit, or asymptote, beyond 
which further increases in capitalist power are bound to create a backlash that might 
destabilize the entire system (Bichler and Nitzan 2010; Kliman, Bichler, and Nitzan 2011; 
Bichler and Nitzan 2012). Capitalists, though, are largely blind to this asymptote. Their power 
drive conditions and compels them to sustain and increase their sabotage in their quest for an 
ever-rising distributive share. Like other ruling classes in history, they are likely to realize they 
have reached the asymptote only when it is already too late.    
 
*** 
 
For our full paper on the subject, see Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, ‘Can Capitalist 
Afford Recovery? Economic Policy When Capital is Power’, Working Papers on Capital as 
Power, No. 2013/01, October 2013, pp. 1-36. (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/377/) 
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